Concept Informatics

Blog · · 4 min read

One supplier, 178 websites: the attack that never touched their code

In short. Malicious JavaScript was found in scripts hosted by Optimizely and loaded by 178 organisations, none of which had a flaw in its own code. Any script from another company runs with the same powers as yours, so list them, keep them off sign-in and payment pages, limit where they can send data, and be able to switch each one off within minutes.

Infographic: one supplier, 178 websites. 188 infected scripts found by researchers, about 34 million page loads served the code, and at least three other vendors were hit by the same attacker first. It lists five actions: list every third-party script, keep them off sign-in and payment pages, limit where a script can send data, use hosted payment fields, and know how to switch each script off in minutes.

On Monday, researchers found malicious JavaScript in scripts hosted by Optimizely, a company that helps businesses test versions of their web pages. As reported, 188 scripts were infected, across 178 organisations, including banks, airlines and broadcasters.

The code was built to take card details, session cookies and screenshots, to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and to push older iPhones towards an exploit kit. Researchers estimate around 34 million page loads served it, with a range of 6 million to 150 million. That counts loads, not victims, and nobody yet knows how many people lost anything. I'm relying on the published reporting, so check the latest before you quote any figure.

The part that should worry you

None of those 178 organisations had a flaw in its own code. They loaded a script from a supplier they trusted, and the supplier was compromised. One line on a page ran inside every customer's site at once.

A script from another company runs with the same powers as your own. It can read every form field and keystroke on the page that loads it, and every cookie not marked HttpOnly. "We trust the vendor" is a decision, not a control.

What I'd do on Monday

  1. List every third-party script you load. Analytics, chat, reviews, testing tools, tag managers. Record what each can reach and which pages it loads on. If a vendor is in the news tomorrow, you should be able to say within the hour whether you use it.
  2. Keep them off the pages that matter. Sign-in, checkout, payment, account settings, admin. No analytics tag needs to watch a password being typed. Testing tools rewrite your pages, so they are the most powerful third party of all. Test checkout steps on your own server.
  3. Limit where a script can send data, not only where it comes from. This attack came from an allowed source. A content security policy that also names the exact hosts your page may connect to, load images from and post forms to stops an altered script sending what it steals to a stranger.
  4. Never type card numbers into your own form. Use your payment provider's hosted fields. Mark session cookies HttpOnly.
  5. Be able to switch each script off in minutes, without a deployment. Salesforce disabled the scripts. Equifax stopped using the vendor. Decide now who makes that call, and how each vendor will tell you about a problem.

If it happens to you, record three things separately: exposed (your page loaded the script), executed (the bad code ran in a visitor's browser) and confirmed (data was taken). Say what you don't know. The researchers say the same attacker used at least three other vendors in the days before, so check yours whenever anyone else's is reported.

Your attack surface includes everyone you trust. Most of us would say we trust our suppliers. The better question is whether we are watching them, and what we would do in the first hour.

Could you list your third-party scripts today?

Source: Report URI findings as reported by Newsweek, 17 November 2026. Figures are researchers' estimates.

Frequently asked questions

What is a third-party script attack?

It is an attack where criminals alter a script that your website loads from another company. The script runs inside your visitors' browsers with the same powers as your own code, so a flaw in your own code is not needed.

How did one supplier affect 178 websites?

Researchers found malicious JavaScript in scripts hosted by Optimizely. Each of the 178 organisations loaded a script from a supplier it trusted, and the supplier was compromised, so one change ran inside every customer's site at once.

What can a third-party script see on my website?

It can read every form field and keystroke on the page that loads it, and every cookie not marked HttpOnly. That is why sign-in, checkout and payment pages are the places to keep scripts off.

How do I find out which third-party scripts my site loads?

List them all: analytics, chat, reviews, testing tools and tag managers. Record what each can reach and which pages it loads on, so that if a vendor is in the news you can say within the hour whether you use it.

How does a content security policy help?

A policy that names the exact hosts your page may connect to, load images from and post forms to stops an altered script sending what it steals to a stranger, even when the script came from an allowed source.

What should I record if it happens to my business?

Record three things separately: exposed (your page loaded the script), executed (the bad code ran in a visitor's browser) and confirmed (data was taken). Say what you do not know.

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